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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
analysis of this problem was made by Judge Friendly in Evans v. S. J. Groves
and Son Co.5 6 When an accident involves a skidding vehicle, there is an immediate reaction suggesting that the skid alone was the cause of the accident. However, this does not answer the ultimate question of what caused the skid. It is
certainly true that such skids usually occur on slippery roads. But, the propensity
of these roads to be slippery is, generally, readily apparent to the driver due
to conditions of snow, slush and/or ice. These patently hazardous conditions
beckon the reasonably prudent driver to exercise a greater degree of caution in
order to satisfy the standard of due care exacted by tort law.50 It would seem
to be only reasonable then, that "proof of a skid on a highway known to be
dangerous takes a plaintiff far enough down the probability road to call on the
defendants for an explanation and, in the absence of a satisfactory one, to go
' 57
to the jury. 1
Additional support for both of these arguments may be found in the
philosophy embraced by the Court in the instant case."8 The Court is accelerating the swing of the pendulum toward enlarging the spectrum of jury discretion
in determining the issue of negligence.5 9 It is an appraisal by the Court that the
jury is better able to make an equitable determination of the presence or absence
of negligence on an ad hoc basis than a Court is able to do by mechanically
applying rigid categorical rules which themselves may have had their basis in
the same speculation, conjecture and surmise so abhorred in Galbraithand Lahr.
DAVID C. HORAN

FAMILY LAW-APPLICATION OF THE RULES
SEIZURE TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST

SEARCH

AND

The petition charging Williams, a fifteen year-old boy, with being a juvenile
delinquent, alleged that he broke into a resort cottage and stole some jewelry.
Two hours after this theft, a security guard saw Williams acting in a suspicious
manner elsewhere in the same resort. Although the guard did not see Williams
commit or attempt to commit a crime,1 he apprehended the youth and turned
him over to the New York State Police. After being questioned in an approved
facility,2 Williams admitted the theft and took the police to his bungalow; there
he returned the stolen jewelry. At 5:00 a.m., after reducing his confession to
a written statement, he was released into the custody of his sister. During the
entire period the police had Williams in custody, they failed to make any
56.
57.
58.
59.

315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963).
See N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a), (c).
Evans v. S.J. Groves & Son, Co., 315 F.2d 335, 343 (2d Cir. 1963).
Instant case at 136, 216 N.E. at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.

1. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 722; N.Y. Code Crhm. Proc. § 183.
2. As required by N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(b) (ii) (here the Ellenville sub-station
of the New York State Police).
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effort to notify his parents of his detention, as required by statute.3 At the
hearing, respondent Williams contended: that the failure of the police t6
notify his parents rendered his confession involuntary and inadmissible; 4 that
the police had no warrant to search his bungalow; and that by reason of his
youth, he could not consent to such a search, so the evidence was illegally seized
and ought to be suppressed. Held: (1) that the failure to notify the juvenile's
parents, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances-the boy's age, the
unlawfulness of his arrest by the guard, and the lateness of the hour-requires
the conclusion that the confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible; 5
(2) that the requirements of "due process" and "fundamental fairness" demand
that the constitutional guarantee aginst unreasonable searches and seizures
be extended to children charged with any act which if done by an adult would
be a crime. Matter of Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Ulster
County Family Ct. 1966).
The aim of the juvenile court is the rehabilitation, as opposed to punishment, of delinquent youth through the paternal care and protection afforded
by specially designed courts and institutions.6 In stressing protection rather
than punishment, this aim departs significantly from the tradition of the
criminal law.7 To effectuate its goals, the juvenile court has attempted to
eliminate both the public scorn of a criminal conviction and the punitive
character of its disposition. 8 Accompanying this rejection of criminality is a
relaxation of criminal procedural safeguards. Because not all criminal procedural safeguards have been considered applicable, a continuing conflict as to
which apply has ensued. 9 This conflict is due primarily to the struggle
between supporters of traditional due process guaranties and advocates of
the application of sociological concepts to benefit juveniles.' 0
Following the suggestion that it is more important to detect a tendency
in a child toward delinquent conduct than to wait until he has committed a
wrongful act before attempting rehabilitation," the federal courts have permitted a liberal application of the parens patriaedoctrine in juvenile proceedings.
However, a district court has stated that unless the parens patriae theory of
3. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(a).

4. Williams also claims that he immediately requested a lawyer and that he was
struck by the interrogating officer.

5. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(d); Galleges v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley

v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); cf. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261
N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965) (decided without reference to the Family Court Act).

6. Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-FundamentalFairness for the Accused in a QuasiCriminal Forum, 50 Minn. L. Rev. at 653 (1966).
7. rd. at 653-54. Cf. Swartz, Punishment and Treatment of Offenders, supra page -.
8. Id. at 654.
9. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 549 (1957);
Brown, The Constitutional Problems of the Juvenile Court Law, 50 Women Law. 3. 89
(and cases cited id. at 90) (1964); see Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(and cases cited in Appendix B; id. at 563).
10. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 190, 407 P.2d 760, 766-67 (1965), appeal
argued,35 U.S.L. Week 3209 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1966).
11. Boardman, New York Family Law 1139 (Biskind ed., Supp. 1966).
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the juvenile court is carried out in practice, the commitment of a juvenile
takes on the outlook of a criminal conviction and as such "cannot withstand
an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards."' 2 A growing
awareness of juvenile court frailties in attempting to apply the parens patriae
doctrine is evidenced by many recent decisions, in which courts have begun
to provide the juvenile those rights previously applicable, but discarded by
the juvenile court experiment. 13 In United States v. Dickerson,14 the District
of Columbia District Court voiced its fear that constitutional rights were
being abrogated by classifying what is in effect a criminal proceeding as a
juvenile hearing. The New Jersey District Court in Application of Johnson,1
stated that "the constitutional protections of fundamental fairness are [not]
to be constricted .... [L]iberalizing criminal procedure is not intended to be
nor can it be allowed, at the expense of constitutional safeguards." Chief Judge
Prettyman in Pee v. United States"6 stated the present rule as to when juvenile
courts are required to afford the child certain protections: "The constitutional
safeguards vouchsafed a juvenile in such proceedings are determined from the
requirements of due process and fair treatment, and not by the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution.... ." It is thus clear that in federal cases
"due process" guides the courts' treatment of juveniles. In United States v.
Morales,'7 a district court following this trend toward a "due process" requirement, held that where a juvenile is charged with an act which if done by an
adult would be a crime "due process and fundamental fairness compel the
12. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). Chief Judge Laws stated, "To
send a juvenile to the usual penitentiary where hardened criminals are kept . . . [and]
where the juvenile would . . . come into contact with them and suffer the same type of
treatment would . . . stamp the case of the juvenile as a criminal case. .

.

. In such

prosecutions, Constitutional safeguards must be vouchsafed the accused." Id. at 650-51.
See the later opinion in the same case, 126 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954).
13. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), which was not a proceeding under a
juvenile court act, the Supreme Court held that the method of obtaining a confession from
a fifteen year-old boy, by continuous interrogation from midnight till 5:00 AM., without
the benefit of counsel or friend violated the due process of the fourteenth amendment.
No "child can be . . . condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements
of due process of law." Id. at 601.
14. 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (D.D.C. 1958) rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) (The court indicated that if the proceeding results in the loss of personal
liberty the constitutional safeguards apply.); see also Alexander, Constitutional Rights in
Juvenile Court, 46 A.B.AJ. 1206, 1207 (1960).
15. 178 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.N.J. 1957).
16. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see Alexander, supra
note 14, at' 1209; Welch, supra note 6, at 672. The District Court for the District of
Columbia had already held that a juvenile's right to counsel is determined directly from
the sixth amendment. Since juvenile delinquency is the determination of guilt for a
specific criminal act, any juvenile proceeding alleging an act which would be a crime
if committed by an adult is imbued with constitutional safeguards, In re Poff, 135 F.
Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955). The court reasoned that it was the legislative intent "to
afford the juvenile protections in addition to those he already possessed under the Federal
Constitution," Id. at 225. See Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (Fundamental fairness requires counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings because
of the consequent stigma and deprivation of liberty.).
17. 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964).
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-"1 The Texas District Court agreed, 19
same safeguards... as for an adult..
noting the growing concern over the juvenile court philosophy, quoting Dickerson 20 and stating, "the constitutional guaranty of fundamental fairness and
due process is applicable to all proceedings ... if the outcome may be deprivation of liberty of the person." 2 '
The question of the constitutional validity of the parens patriae rationale
for reducing procedural safeguards was treated by the Supreme Court in
Kent v. United StatesY2 The Court noted the growing gap between theory
and practice in the juvenile courts, and evidence that some juvenile courts
lack the necessary personnel to do a proper job. The Court agreed that in
many cases the juvenile is getting the "worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."23 Consistent, however, with its policy
of judicial restraint, the Court held that the above concern "does not induce
us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties
which would be applicable to adults charged with the ... [same] offense...
At present, the federal
must be applied in juvenile court proceedings ....
the standards of "due
against
proceedings
juvenile
the
are
measuring
courts
cases and particularly
recent
However,
fairness."
"fundamental
process" and
of treatment afforded
the
manner
with
dissatisfaction
Court's
the
Kent show
the juvenile under the present rationale and may be a forecast that the federal
courts will soon require the same constitutional safeguards in juvenile cases
as in criminal cases.
In New York, the constitutionality of parens patriae was first upheld in
People v. Lewis.2 5 The proceeding in Lewis took place under the Children's
Court Act,2 6 a statute by which, the Court of Appeals held, the concept of
",24

18. Id. at 164-65. The court agrees with the opinion of Chief Judge Forman in
Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.N.J. 1957) that "the trend in recent
decisions is to hold that there shall be no greater diminution of the rights of a child, as
safeguarded by the Constitution, than should be suffered by an adult charged with an
offense equivalent to the alleged act of delinquency of the child." By similar reasoning the
right of a juvenile to counsel was affirmned by the Supreme Court in Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962), a criminal case, which held that to let the confession of a
fourteen year-old stand in view of the totality of the circumstances would be to treat him as
if he bad no constitutional rights.
19. Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
20. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959). "The test must be the nature and the
essence of the proceeding rather than its title. If the result may be a loss of personal liberty,
the constitutional safeguards apply." Id. at 902.
21. Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex. 1965).
22. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
23. Id. at 556.
24. Id. at 556 (Emphasis added.).
25. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933). The Court
distinguished People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927), as being a criminal
trial and not a juvenile proceeding even though it arose under the Buffalo Children's
Court Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1925, ch. 385.
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 393.
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crime and punishment had been removed, and by which "all suggestion and taint
of criminality was intended to be and has been done away with.1 27 Since the
proceeding was not criminal, criminal procedural rights need not be applied.
It was pointed out, however, that although the criminal constitutional safeguards are inapplicable, "there is no implication that a purely socialized trial
of a specific issue may properly or legally be had."128 Since not all the constitutional safeguards of a criminal trial apply to the juvenile proceeding, the
legislature has a wide discretion in deciding the process of law due in this
area. 29 The present Family Court Act expresses a determination to provide
"due process of law." 30 The act seeks to distinguish the basically legal aspects
from the social aspects of the proceeding by holding the hearing in two phases,
an adjudicatory phase3 ' and a dispositional phase. 82
There remains for establishment at the dispositional hearing
the necessary allegations in the petition that the respondent requires
supervision, treatment or confinement. ... 33 Accordingly, if counsel
can establish that notwithstanding the commission of the acts alleged
in the petition no real purpose would be served by suspending judgment, probationary supervision, placement or commitment, there
would be basis for dismissal of the petition and avoidance of whatever
stigma or disability might otherwise attach to an adjudication of
delinquency .... 34
The petition itself must set forth fully the act complained of, and must
be proved by a preponderance of competent evidence.85 The term delinquency
27. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 176, 183 N.E. 353, 354 (1932), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 709 (1933) (Emphasis added.).
28. Id. at 178, 183 N.E. at 355.
29. N.Y. Joint Legis. Comm. on Ct. Reorg., Report II: Family Ct. Act 9 (1962).
30. Ibid.; see also comments to N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 311, at 47 and § 711, at 110.
See Matter of Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966).
Keating, J., writing for the majority, referring to the case of People v. Lewis, stated:
We need not here engage in an extensive re-examination of that case because we believe that the rationale underlying that opinion has been rejected
by the Legislature and that the specific holding of the case has been overruled
by statute.
While the Family Court Act specifically states that the proceedings held
thereunder are not criminal in nature, the various provisions made for the protection of the rights of children who are charged with juvenile delinquency are
indicative of a legislative recognition of the fact that such proceedings, resulting
as they do in a loss of personal freedom, are at the very least quasi-criminal in
nature. As the legislative committee report states: "Any commitment-whether
'civil' or 'criminal,' whether assertediy for 'punitive' or 'rehabilitative' purposes-involves a grave interference with personal liberty."
Id. at 62, 224 N.E.2d at 106, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
31. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 742 (embodies the legal aspects, the determination of
whether the juvenile did the particular act charged).
32. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 743 (whether the person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent
requires supervision, treatment or confinement) ; see Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501, 511 (1963).
33. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 731.
34. Isaacs, supra note 32, at 516; see N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 751; see also Laufer, New
Directions for Court Treatment of Youth, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 452, 466 (1963).
35. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 731, 732, 742, 744; see Oughterson, Family Court Jurisdiction.
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is retained to describe only those juveniles who have violated a criminal
statute.8 6 No adjudication is considered a forfeiture of any right or privilege:37
it does not disqualify any person from subsequently holding public office,
35
it is not deemed a conviction nor is the juvenile considered a criminal; but
the adjudication may be used by another court when considering, for purposes
39
of sentencing, the childhood of the adult offender. The law guardian system,
lawyer participation was
that
provided in the act, reversed the earlier belief
incompatible with the concept of "social courts" and implements the legislative finding that counsel is indispensible to the practical realization of due
41
process.40 The New York statute does not provide for "waiver" of jurisdiction.
Waiver in juvenile court occurs when, finding the delinquent not amenable
to its rehabilitative purpose, the court transfers the youth to a criminal court,
and thereby places him in the danger of a criminal proceeding. Although
greater procedural safeguards are afforded in the Family Court, the practices
42
and procedures found necessary in the criminal courts are not generally applied.
In addition many of the procedural safeguards mentioned in the Family Court
Act do not as a matter of practice obtain. 43
The acts leading to commitment for delinquency are those considered
criminal when performed by an adult. The question is therefore raised as to the
44
legality of tendering evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
12 Buffalo L. Rev. 467, 474-75 (1963); see, e.g., Matter of Doe, 44 Misc. 2d 678, 255
N.Y.S.2d 33 (Kings County Family Ct. 1964). The court stated that in juvenile delinquency
proceedings less formal proof is needed than in criminal court; Matter of Rutane, 37
Misc. 2d 234, 234 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Kings County Family Ct. 1962). The court held that a
confession of thirteen year old boy after seven hours of interrogation in a police station
and absent a lawyer or parent is involuntary and inadmissible.
36. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(a); Habitually disobedient juveniles or those beyond
parental control are described as "persons in need of supervision." N.Y. Family Ct. Act
§ 712(b).
37. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 782; see, e.g., Hambel v. Levine, 243 App. Div. 530, 275
N.Y.Supp. 702, 703 (2d Dep't 1934): "The adjudication of the court will not operate to
the detriment of the defendant in his desire to enter the civil service."
38. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 781; see People v. Peele, 12 N.Y.2d 890, 891, 188 N.E.2d
265, 237 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1000 (1963): "EJluvenile delinquency adjudications are not convictions of crime .. .in New York. . . ."; Application of Giroffi, 283 App. Div. 890, 130
N.Y.S.2d 28, at 29 (2d Dep't 1954): "An adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not a
criminal conviction."
39. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 784; see also Oughterson, supra note 35, at 478.
40. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 241, 741; see Isaacs, supra note 32, at 501; Paulsen, The
New York Family Court Act, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 420, 423 (1963); see also Matter of Lang,
44 Misc. 2d 900, 904, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. County Family Ct. 1965): "[Tlhe Judge
is required to advise the child of his right to remain silent, his right to be represented by
counsel of his own choosing, and of his right to have a law guardian assigned. ...
41. Cf. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 713, 715.
42. Matter of Jones, 43 Misc. 2d 390, 251 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Queens County Family Ct.
1964).

43. See generally New York City Juvenile Delinquency EvaluationProject, 15 Interim
Report 10 (1960); Horwitz, The Problem of the Quid Pro Quo, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 528,
531 (1963).

44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d
478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961); see also Samuels, Family Court Law and Practice in New
York 307 (1964).
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Eighty years ago, the Supreme Court held that the fourth and fifth amendments
apply to all invasions into a person's privacy. 45 It is not the "breaking of his
doors"' 4 6 that constitutes the offense but rather the invasion of an individual's
right of personal security 47 by the forcible extortion of testimony, and seizure
of personal belongings. 48 The restrictions upon unlawful searches and seizures
are designed to protect against invasion of privacy and are not merely rules
of evidence to exclude unreliable or prejudicial facts. 49 In the case of Mapp v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court stated that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a state court."'50 The Court, however, has declined to clarify whether "all
evidence" includes evidence to be used in a juvenile proceeding.r' Juvenile
delinquency proceedings in New York State are classified as non-criminal;
therefore, an examination of the application of the rules against illegal search
and seizure in non-criminal areas seems appropriate. New York cases dealing
with search and seizure in the non-criminal area fall primarily into three
categories: civil cases in which the unlawful search was conducted by a private
individual; civil cases in which the unlawful search was conducted by a
governmental official; and civil cases which are termed quasi-criminal because
unlike civil proceedings they involve penalties, forfeitures, and other similarities
to criminal law.
The first category is exemplified by Sackler v. Sackler. 2 The issue in
Sackler was whether facts gained as the result of an illegal search by a private
person should be excluded from evidence in a civil (divorce) proceeding. The
majority noted that where evidence illegally seized by an official is accepted
in evidence at a criminal trial the government is placed in the untenable position of attempting to enforce the law while at the same time encouraging its
own officers to disobey it by rewarding the fruits of its defiance. In a divorce
proceeding, on the other hand, since the government is not a party to the
illegal search, the admission' of this evidence would not encourage illegal
forays by the police. 53 The Court of Appeals affirmed but limited the holding
45. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
46. Id. at 630.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); but see Harling v. United States, 295
F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1961) decided within three weeks of and without mentioning
Mapp stated that "safeguards of the criminal law, such as . . . the exclusionary Mallory
rule, [354 U.S. 49 (1957)] have no general application in juvenile proceedings."
51. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
52. 16 A.D.2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962).
53. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hopkins points out that private persons can
still gain by defying the law. Observance of the exclusionary rule in all trials would
satisfy the constitutional requirements; avoid the violence and trespass often involved in
an unlawful entry and search; avoid breach of the peace by the lawful repulsion of the
trespasser; and courts would not be asked to enforce one right and by so doing disregard
a greater right. Id. at 432, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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so that only evidence obtained by a private person by means of an illegal
54
search and seizure is not for this reason to be rejected in a civil case.
An an example of the second category, an action to collect double indemnity under an insurance policy, the plaintiff moved to exclude certain
findings made by the county coroner (a public official) which she alleged to
have been the result of an unlawful autopsy. 55 The court was of the opinion
that there is merit to the widow's contention that Mapp5" and Loria57 apply to
civil as well as criminal cases. 58 There appears to be no reason to follow
different rules as to evidence obtained by search and seizure in violation of
the Constitution; in both instances the evidence should be excluded. However,
the court did not pass on the widow's motion. 59 A year later when this same
question was again raised, the Court of Appeals reserved until an appropriate
case the validity of an unlawful search by an official person.60 The Court there
held that the search of the defendant's house by a public officer without a
warrant, however, was in violation of defendant's constitutional rights to the
extent that the evidence was used in a criminal proceeding. 0 '
Cases in the third category have held that although the proceeding was
technically a civil proceeding it was in substance and effect criminal 2 since
the object was to punish the individual. Any evidence obtained by a government official which could not be utilized in a criminal proceeding 63 cannot be
utilized in a quasi-criminal proceeding.6 4 The rationale of this holding is:
54. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.S.2d 40, 203 N...2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964);
see also Price, Evidence, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 376, 382 (1965).
55. Rocco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup Ct.
1963).
56. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
58. They were also of the opinion that the dicta in Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N.Y.
308, 56 N.E.2d 718 (1944) was overruled. That dicta maintained that even if a statement
in a civil case is illegally obtained by a police officer it would not be inadmissible into the
record. The court in Rocco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43
(Sup. Ct. 1963), noted that Bloodgood was based upon People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926), a criminal case, which was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179
N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
59. Rocco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
60. People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 200 N.E.2d 441, 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452,
455 (1964).

61. Ibid. Is the Court in fact saying that persons suspect of crime are to have
greater protection against unconstitutional searches and seizures than are persons subject
only to a civil proceeding? See Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure in New
York 1941-1965, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 297, 315 (1965).
62. See, e.g., Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 24
A.D.2d 616, 262 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1965); Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v.
Laverne, Inc., 24 A.D. 615, 262 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1965).
63. People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 200 NXE.2d 441, 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452,
455 (1964).
64. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 616, 262
N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1965).
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punishment involves the idea of penalty; 65 the basic character of a penalty does
not change by being inflicted in a civil suit instead of a criminal action;00
therefore a suit for penalty is within the constitutional exclusionary rule. 7
The Appellate Division 68 has held that the exclusionary rule applies
whenever a government official illegally seizes evidence to be used in a trial
to impose official forfeitures, penalties, or similar sanctions.69 The juvenile pro70
ceeding by its very nature imposes official forfeitures, penalties and sanctions.
In the Family Court case of Matter of Ronny, 71 the question of whether Mapp
72
applied to a proceeding under the Family Court Act was squarely posed.
The court noted that the juvenile proceeding indeed seemed to be quasi-criminal
in nature 73 and accordingly held that "young persons have the same constitutional rights as older ones.. .. ,,74 This is not changed because the proceeding
is termed civil.75 "The purpose of the exclusionary evidence rule is to deter
the police, and the police investigate cases involving children." 70
The law in New York as to the applicability of the fourth amendment
and the exclusionary rule of Mapp to all civil cases is unsettled. However, as to
the juvenile proceeding, the Court of Appeals in People v. Lewis77 had set down
the law. Twenty-nine years later, constrained by Mapp, the New York Court
of Appeals held that illegally obtained evidence would be excluded from all
state trials. 78 The following year the New York Legislature enacted the Family
Court Act and expressly provided the juvenile with "a due process of law."17
65. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 615, 262 N.Y.S.2d
622 (2d Dep't 1965).
66. Ibid.; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) ; United States. v. Chouteau,
102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880).
67. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 615, 262 N.Y.S.2d
622 (2d Dep't 1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); cf. Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
68. Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 A.D. 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1st Dep't
1966). Official person had unlawfully stopped and searched plaintiff's car and confiscated
several cases of liquor.
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between Sackler v. Sacker, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964), and

Rocco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1963), but

stated that whatever the right of the parties are in a civil divorce proceeding, the approach
taken by Sackler has no application here.
73. Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Queens County Family Ct.
1963); cf. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954)

.(Musmanno, J.,

dissenting), cert. denied, 348 US. 973 (1955). Incarceration of youth is indeed punishment.

74. In Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 210, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (Queens County
Family Ct. 1963).
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611 (1965).
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77. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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The Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule does not apply, when the
illegal evidence is gathered by a private person.8 ° The case of an official person
gathering the illegal evidence is one step closer to a criminal prosecution and
the decision becomes that much more difficult."' The Court of Appeals, in the
one case that has reached it, has taken no stand on the question and accordingly
reserved judgment. 82 In the quasi-criminal area no cases have reached the
Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Divisions in both the First and
Second Departments have held that illegally obtained evidence may not be
introduced.88 In the only juvenile proceeding concerning search and seizure
decided after Mapp, the Queens County Family Court held that such evidence
in a juvenile (quasi-criminal) proceeding would fall within the exclusionary
84

rule.

The major issue presented by the instant case as stated by the court is,
whether the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures [applicable to state criminal proceedings] need
not be extended to juvenile delinquency proceedings because of their
noncriminal nature or whether a due process of law, which the Legislature says it is the intention of the Family Court Act to provide...
[section 711], requires that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio . . . be applied. 85
In formulating the decision, Judge Elwyn relied on Pee v. United States,8 6
which, in interpreting the Juvenile Court Act, 87 stated that the "constitutional
safeguards vouchsafed a juvenile in such proceedings are determined from
the requirements of due process and fair treatment, and not by the direct
application of the clauses of the Constitution which in terms apply to criminal
cases."88s The court held that when the juvenile is charged with an act which
80. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
81. An official person gathers evidence as an agent of the official body he works for.
The official body then, state or municipal, is involved in the unlawful gathering of illegal
evidence; cf. Sacder v. Sackler, 16 A.D.2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962).
82. People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 200 N.E.2d 441, 443, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452,
454-55 (1964).
83. See, e.g., Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 24
A.D.2d 616, 262 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1965); Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v.
Laverne, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 615, 262 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1965); Leogrande v. State
Liquor Authority, 25 A.D.2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1st Dep't 1966).
84. Cf. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 790, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (2d Dist. 1952)
(The juvenile Court should never be made an instrument with which to deny a minor of any
constitutional right offered an adult.); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 437-38, 93 N.W.2d
281, 286 (1958) (Unlawfully obtained evidence is to be excluded from a civil trial.) ; State
v. Herold, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 293, 297, 30 Ohio Op. 2d 135, 197 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ct. Appeals
1964): "The Juvenile Court is a court of law and all the safeguards of due process should
be adhered to meticulously."; In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340, 344 (La. 4th Cir. 1964) (If
the child is not shown by constitutional proofs to be a delinquent the Juvenile Court has
no jurisdiction over him.); Application of Gault,°99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), appeal
argued, No. 116, U.S.L. Week 3209 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1966).
85. Matter of Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 168-169, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109 (Ulster County
Family Ct. 1966) (Italics supplied.); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
86. 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
87. 52 Stat. 596 (1938), as amended, D.C. Code §§ 11-901-11-950 (1951).
88. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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if done by an adult would be a crime, fundamental fairness requires that the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures be extended
to the juvenile. It is difficult to determine if the standard of due process applied here was that provided by the Constitution, or that provided by section
711 of the Family Court Act.
As to the second issue raised, the admissibility of the confession, the
court stated that if the juvenile had in fact made a request for a lawyer, or
had he been physically intimidated by the police, the confession would be
involuntary and therefore, inadmissible. The court does not decide this issue
of fact but holds rather that the police have a positive duty by statute80 to
take affirmative steps to contact the juvenile's parents before interrogating
him. The question of whether failure to take such action alone so taints the
confession with involuntariness has never been directly passed upon. 0 The
court here holds that the totality of the circumstances91 coupled with the
necessity for the observance of fundamental fairness compel the conclusion
that the element of compulsion was present and therefore, the confession was
92
involuntary and inadmissible.
Because it has been the tendency to read the fourth and fifth amendments
as complementary, the criminal aspect of the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure has been emphasized.93 However, the procedural safeguards
of the Constitution were developed long before the idea of a juvenile proceeding
was conceived. These procedural safeguards set forth a due process to be
followed in all trials in which the outcome might be a deprivation of liberty. 4
The fact that later some proceedings were termed civil, quasi-criminal, or
criminal, is constitutionally unimportant; the outcome of the proceeding is
the determining factor, not the label. It has been said that "basic human
rights do not depend on nomenclature." 9 5 The purpose of the juvenile court
was to get children out of and away from the criminal courtroom. It was the
intention of the founders of the juvenile court to add to and implement the
child's rights beyond what the Constitution provided, 0 not to detract from
the child's existing rights.9 7 Although reformation and rehabilitation have been
89. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724.
90. Matter of Dennis, 20 A.D.2d 86, 244 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1963); Matter of
Addison, 20 A.D.2d 90, 245 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1963).
91. Disregard of N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724, the boy's age, the unlawfulness of his
arrest by the security guard, the lateness of the hour, the absence of parents or lawyer.
92. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(d); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); cf. People v. DeFlumer, 16 N.Y.2d 20, 209 N.E.2d 93, 261
N.Y.S.2d 42 (1965) (decided without reference to the Family Court Act).
93. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
94. Coleman, The Constitutional Rights of a Juvenile Delinquent, 50 Women Law. J.
84, 85 (1964).
95. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); Coleman, supra note 94, at 85.
96. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Poff,
135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955); Alexander, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46
A.B.A.J. 1206, 1208 (1960).
97. Ibid.
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recognized as important objectives of criminal jurisprudence, 98 there is no
suggestion that such objectives would justify a reduction in criminal safeguards0 9 It is the degree of interference by the state and not the motivation
behind that interference which is important for fourteenth amendment due
process.' 00
If we are to continue to deny the child the protections we extend to
criminals we must at least insure that the child receive the full benefit of the
parens patriae doctrine which has been offered in its stead. If the child is
not in fact the beneficial recepient of this doctrine, then we have most certainly
and most unjustly deprived him of his constitutional rights. 01' How far criminal
procedural safeguards may be discarded seems to vary inversely with how far
the philosophy of the juvenile court is realized in fact.'0 2 Over thirty years
ago, in People v. Lewis,'"° it was found that all taints of criminality had in
fact been removed and consequently the constitutional procedures afforded a
criminal were no longer needed in a juvenile proceeding. However, this appears
to have been a finding divorced from reality. It is presently clear that several
criminal "taints" remain. 0 4 It is also apparent that facilities for institutionalized
treatment appear to be badly lacking, as are trained personnel. 0 5 The child
then appears to be receiving "the worst of both worlds." He gets neither the
protections afforded adults nor the regenerative treatment postulated by parens
patriae.106 It is time we opened our eyes to this situation and stopped paying
our children in counterfeit coin. 10 7 The instant case may provide a start.
ALAN EBER
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